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Overcooling accidents are typically resulting in power increase due to 
negative moderator feedback. There are more protection set points responsible for 
terminating power increase. OPDT protection set point is typically protection from 
exceeding fuel centre line temperature due to reactivity and power increase. It is 
important to actuate reactor trip signal early enough, but to be able to filter out 
events where actuation is not necessary. Different concepts of coolant temperature 
compensation as part of OPDT set point protection were studied for decrease of 
feedwater temperature accident and for small main steam line breaks from full 
power for NPP Krško. Computer code RELAP5/mod 3.3 was used in calculation. The 
influence of different assumptions in accident description as well as nuclear core 
characteristics were described. 
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The accidents that manifest in the overcooling of the primary side are 
typically caused by a failure on the secondary side that lead to an increased heat 
removal in the steam generators. In the presence of the negative moderator 
reactivity coefficient, the excessive cooling of the primary side leads to an increase 
of nuclear power. The temperature increase in reactor vessel which is a measure of 
the core heat power will increase whereas the cold leg temperature decreases due to 
increased heat removal. The coolant temperature decrease leads also to an increase 
of coolant density and outsurge from the pressurizer. The primary pressure will 
decrease and Safety Injection (SI) signal may be actuated. As a consequence of the 
nuclear power increase in combination with a pressure decrease, overcooling 
accidents (with no protective functions) can result in fuel temperature increase and 
departure from nuclear boiling (DNB) which can ultimately lead to fuel damage. 
The necessary protection against the overcooling accidents is provided by reactor 
trip that will reduce the core power to decay heat and the fuel temperature to no 
load values. The second protective action consists of the stopping the excessive heat 
extraction from the primary side and depends on the initial event (feedwater 
malfunction or excessive steam load). The reactor protection system will actuate the 
reactor trip on any of the following trip signals: a) Power range high neutron flux, b) 
Overpower ΔT (OPΔT), c) Overtemperature ΔT (OTΔT), d) Low pressurizer pressure, 
e) SI or f) Turbine trip signal. The OPΔT and OTΔT reactor trip functions are 
intended to provide fuel integrity protection during the overcooling accidents such 
as feedwater system malfunction or excessive steam load increase as well as during 
a number of overpower and overtemperature events (e.g., rod withdrawal at power 
and uncontrolled boron dilution).  
The measured narrow range (NR) temperature signals are used in plant 
protection system (the setpoints for OPΔT and OTΔT reactor trip), as well as in a 
number of plant control systems (automatic rod control system, steam dump, 
pressurizer level control). During the 2013 outage the NPP Krško has undergone 
the Resistance Temperature Detector Bypass Elimination (RTDBE) project to 
improve operation and maintenance. The Resistance Temperature Detectors (RTD) 
bypass manifold system for the NR temperature measurement has been removed 
and the fast–response thermowell (TW) RTDs were embedded in the thermowell 
structure as a part of the primary loop wall. The response time of TW RTDs is 
slower due to thermal inertia of the additional metal mass attached to the RTD 
than the response time of the directly immersed RTDs. On the other hand, for TWs, 
there is no delay due to loop transport or thermal lag. The RCS temperature 
measurement response time is accounted for in reactor protection system set points 
as well as in plant control system settings. The OPΔT protection function has been 
modified as part of RTDBE. In the old pre-RTDBE implementation the 
compensated measured temperature difference ΔT was calculated by applying the 
lead-lag on measured temperature difference. In the new implementation, different 
compensations were applied for the measured hot and cold leg temperature. For 
overcooling accidents the OPΔT trip protects the core due to the increasing 
compensated measured temperature difference ΔT whereas the OPΔT trip set point 
does not change from its steady state value. The safety concern for the overcooling 





accidents is that after RTDBE the response time of the OPΔT may increase thus 
decreasing the margin to DNB. 
Two overcooling accidents for NPP Krško were analyzed using RELAP5/mod 
3.3 for NPP Krško: 1. Feedwater Malfunction-Decrease in Feedwater Temperature 
(FM DFT) and 2. Hot Full Power Main Steam Line Break (HFP MSLB). In the 
analyses different concepts for coolant temperature compensation in OPΔT 
protection set point were studied and the adequacy of the protection functions were 
investigated. 
 
2. CALCULATION MODEL FOR NPP KRŠKO 
The RELAP5/mod 3.3 nodalization for NPP Krško, Figure 1, developed at 
Faculty of Electrical Engineering and Computing (FER) was used for transient 
analysis, [1] and [2]. The plant model has been updated taking into account the 
RTDBE project realized during the plant 2013 outage. The explicit RTD bypass 
manifold system for the NR Reactor Coolant System (RCS) temperature 
measurement was removed and it was replaced with compensated temperature 
signals that were modelled to take into account the thermowell structure's thermal 
lag. RELAP5 model consists of 481 thermal-hydraulic volumes, 518 junctions, 378 
heat structures with 2107 mesh points, 733 control variables and 197 variable and 
221 logical trips. It includes major modifications related to the Krško modernization 
project as well as RTDBE project; e.g., the model of the replacement steam 
generator (RSG) based on data provided by the RSG designer (Siemens), power 
uprate, removal of the guide tubes plugs inside the core as well as changes to the 
protection and plant control systems. The RELAP5 model contains the models of the 
NPP Krško monitoring as well as protection and control systems, e.g., the detailed 
models of Safety Injection (SI) system, Main feedwater (MFW) and Auxiliary 
feedwater (AFW) system as well as of control systems (automatic rod control, 
pressurizer pressure and level control, steam dump control with realistic 
representation of steam dump valves and steam generator level control). 






Figure 1. RELAP5/mod 3.3 nodalization scheme for NPP Krško
 
2.1 Reactor Trip Protection Functions during Overcooling Accidents 
The OTΔT and OPΔT protection functions are schematically presented in 
Figure 2 (Old configuration before RTDBE) and in Figure 3 (New plant 
configuration after RTDBE). 
At the plant, the set point for OPΔT trip is continuously calculated by solving 






















































intsetpoTOP∆ - Overpower ΔT set point 
0T∆ - Indicated ΔT at nominal thermal power 
avgrefavg TT , - Measured and indicated loop average temperature at nominal thermal 
power 
4K  - Set point bias 
65 , KK  - Constants that depend on dynamic behaviour of the measured avgT  





3t  - Time constant (s) of dynamic signal compensator (impulse) 
7t  - Time constant (s) in the measured avgT lag compensator 
s  - Laplace transform variable (s-1) 
intsetpoTOP∆  is limited to the value calculated at nominal Tavg (Tavgref) 
The calculated intsetpoTOP∆ is compared with two sets of loop temperature 
difference measurements (ΔT) per loop. The OPΔT reactor trip function will trip the 
reactor on coincidence of two out of four signals satisfying the condition below: 
TTOP setpo ∆≤∆ int (2)
In the old plant configuration (before RTDBE, Figure 2) the lead-lag 
compensation was applied after measured temperature difference ΔT was formed. 
For the current post-RTDBE plant configuration, the measured compensated ΔT for 
the OPΔT protection function is calculated by subtracting the compensated Tcold 
signal from the compensated Thot signal. The hot leg temperature is compensated by 
a lag element in order to suppress the oscillations in the hot leg measurement due 
to hot leg streaming (lag element, time constant=τ8 in Figure 3). The compensation 
of the cold leg temperature that has a rather uniform distribution across the pipe is 
directed to fulfil the efficiency of the OPΔT protection function for overcooling 
accidents. Among the available options, the lead-lag compensation (with greater 
lead time constant) as well as the lag compensation was considered. The lead-lag 
element for Tcold has shown to be very sensitive to the outside electromagnetic 
disturbances thus leading to unnecessary reactor trips. 
Finally, at the plant, the measured compensated ΔT will be calculated using 













where τ5 < τ8. Thus, the increase of the compensated measured ΔT is 
accelerated for overcooling accidents since the cold leg temperature decreases due to 
excessive heat removal in steam generators. Due to the fact that OPΔTsetpoint is 
limited to the value at nominal power since the RCS average temperature decreases 
during the overcooling accidents, the OPΔT trip may be actuated due to increasing 
measured temperature difference (ΔT), Eqs. (2) and (3).   
 






Figure 2. Old (before RTDBE) OTΔT/OPΔT control block scheme 
 
Figure 3. New (post-RTDBE) OTΔT/OPΔT control block scheme 
 
3. ANALYSIS OF OVERCOOLING ACCIDENTS FOR OPΔT 
OPTIMIZATION 
The typical overcooling accidents that are used for an assessment of the 
efficiency of OPΔT protection function are the Feedwater Malfunction – Decrease in 
Feedwater Temperature (FM DFT) and the Hot Full Power Main Steam Line Break 
(HFP MSLB). Both accidents were analyzed using RELAP5/mod 3.3 code. In order 





to make an assessment of the adequacy of the OPΔT protection, sensitivity study 
calculations were performed with different concepts for coolant temperature 
measurement and OPΔT set point calculation. For the base case best-estimate 
calculation the current post-RTDBE NPP Krško configuration, cycle 26, and with 
the cold leg temperature compensation with lag element (time constant=2 s) in 
measured ΔT signal was used. The End of Cycle (EOC) conditions with maximum 
negative moderator temperature reactivity coefficient were assumed. The power 
range high neutron flux trip was not credited in the analysis. Steam line pressure 
signal for steam line isolation and safety injection is compensated by lead-lag 
element introduced along with RTDBE with lead and lag time constant equal to 48 
s and 8 seconds, respectively. 
3.1 Analysis of Feedwater System Malfunction – Decrease in FW 
Temperature (FM DFT) 
 
The accident is simulated by a step decrease in the feed water temperature 
from the initial full power (492.7 K) to a minimum credible value (414.55 K). There 
are a number of events that can cause the feedwater temperature decrease, e.g., the 
opening of the feedwater heater bypass valve, a spurious trip of the heater drain 
pumps, or the break of steam flow to the high pressure heaters. The results for the 
base case best-estimate calculation with the lag element (time constant=2 s) for the 
cold leg temperature compensation in OPΔT function are presented in Figure 4 
through Figure 7. As a consequence of feedwater temperature decrease and the fact 
that the flow to the turbine remained constant, the heat transferred in the steam 
generators will increase and the coolant temperature on the primary side will 
decrease, Figure 4 and Figure 5. In the presence of negative moderator reactivity 
coefficient, decrease in moderator temperature will result in an increase in core 
power and fuel temperature increase. The Doppler reactivity coefficient is negative 
and it will reduce the total reactivity due to fuel temperature increase, Figure 6. If 
the automatic control system is in operation, decrease in coolant temperature may 
cause control rod withdrawal in an attempt to maintain the average coolant 
temperature at its programmed value. This may cause a further increase of nuclear 
power and fuel temperature. The decrease in coolant temperature will result in 
coolant density increase, causing the outsurge from the pressurizer and the 
subsequent decrease in the primary pressure. The necessary protection against the 
FM DFT accident is provided by reactor trip that will reduce the core power to 
decay heat and the fuel temperature to no load values. Further, the feedwater that 
causes the cooldown on the primary side will be isolated on either the low average 
RCS temperature in combination with reactor trip or by safety injection signal that 
may be actuated due to low pressurizer pressure. The reactor trip can be actuated 
on either of the following signals: Power range high neutron flux, OPΔT or OTΔT, 
Low pressurizer pressure and Turbine trip (on High-high SG water level). The 
OPΔT provides the specific protection against two major concerns during FM DFT, 
i.e. the high neutron flux and low DNB ratio (DNBR). Both the nuclear power 
increase and the DNB are managed by the measured compensated temperature 
difference, whereas the OPΔT set point is limited to its steady state value since the 
average temperature decreases in the transient. In our case, the OPDT trip trips 





the reactor (44.3 s after transient begin) before the temperature error in the 
Automatic rod control system increased above the value for control rod movement, 
Figure 6 and Figure 7. In order to estimate the influence of different RCS 
temperature measurement concepts and OPΔT set point calculation the sensitivity 
study calculations have been performed. Five groups of FM DFT cases have been 
analyzed: 
1. RTDBE base case best-estimate calculation, OPΔT cold leg temperature 
compensation: lag (time constant=2 s). Two cases have been analyzed: 
a) dft_be_00_auto (Automatic rod control system active) and 
b) dft_be_00_manual (Automatic rod control system not active) 
2. RTDBE best-estimate calculation, OPΔT cold leg temperature compensation: 
lag (time constant=7 s). The aim of the sensitivity calculation is to estimate 
the influence of cold leg temperature lag time constant. Two cases have been 
analyzed: 
a) dft_be_01_auto (Automatic rod control system active) and 
b) dft_be_01_manual (Automatic rod control system not active) 
3. RTDBE best-estimate calculation, OPΔT cold leg temperature lead-lag 
compensation with lead and lag time constants equal to 30 s and 10 s, 
respectively. Only the case with automatic rod control system not active was 
analyzed: dft_be_02_manual. 
4. RTDBE conservative calculation with the assumptions from the referent 
literature, e.g., ref. [5]: 1) The Safety Analysis Limit (SAL) for OPΔT set point 
calculation with K4=1.15 instead of 1.08, 2) Conservative moderator 
(maximum) and Doppler (minimum) reactivity feedback coefficients, 3) 
Turbine trip on reactor trip not credited, 4) Maximum feed water flow 
(feedwater flow=steam flow until feedwater isolation), 5) The minimum 
initial SG mass (10% less than nominal), 6) The maximum initial RCS 
average temperature (580.55 K) and 7) The feed water temperature decreases 
instantaneously at the very entrance of the steam generator (without delay 
from feedwater header). OPΔT cold leg temperature compensation lag time 
constant=2 s. Two cases have been analyzed: 
a) dft_sal_auto (Automatic rod control system active) and 
b) dft_sal_manual (Automatic rod control system not active) 
5. RTD best-estimate calculation. The case represents the configuration before 
the RTDBE modification, i.e., with RTD bypass. Two cases have been 
analyzed: 
a) dft_rtd_auto (Automatic rod control system active) and 
b) dft_rtd_manual (Automatic rod control system not active) 
The results for the FM-DFT analysis for the sensitivity study are 
summarized in Table I. For an assessment of fuel integrity the maximum nuclear 
power and the maximum core heat power were observed. The comparison of the two 
base cases (after and before RTDBE- cases 1 and 5) shows the slower response of 
the OPΔT protection function for the new post-RTDBE than for the old pre-RTDBE 
configuration and correspondingly the higher maximum core heat power for the 
former case. For the post-RTDBE the OPΔT trip is actuated 4.1 s later than for the 
pre-RTDBE and the maximum values for the core heat power for the post-RTDBE 
and pre-RTDBE are equal to 109.5% and 107.69%, respectively. The sensitivity 





study calculation for the post-RTDBE configuration has shown a relatively small 
difference between the two lag compensations (2 s and 7 s); i.e., the maximum 
values for heat power are equal to 109.5% and 111.9%, respectively. The case 3 has 
resulted in a considerably faster reactor trip and the maximum core heat power was 
only slightly above the nominal value (103.4%). However, as already mentioned, the 
lead-lag compensation for Tcold will not be used because under normal operational 
conditions it causes unnecessary reactor trips. In general, for best-estimate cases 
the transient was terminated before the temperature error in the Automatic rod 
control system rose above the value to start the control rod movement. For the 
conservative calculation (Case 4) the resulting temperature error was even negative 
due to significant increase of nuclear power and the control rods were inserted into 
the core thus reducing the nuclear power. A very good agreement between RELAP5 
analysis (case 4) and referent literature (ref. [5]) was obtained. The maximum core 
heat power in RELAP5 analysis and in ref. [5] were obtained for the case with 
manual rod control (117.8% and 118.6%). 
 
Figure 4. FM DFT analysis, base case, Nuclear and core heat power and power 
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Figure 5. FM DFT analysis, base case, RCS loop temperature and RCS average 
temperature 
 
Figure 6. FM DFT analysis, base case, Reactivity 
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Figure 7. FM DFT analysis, base case, OPΔT and OTΔT set points 
 
3.2 Analysis of Hot Full Power Main Steam Line Break (HFP MSLB) 
Steam line break can result from a rupture of the main steam piping or 
branch steam piping. Depending on the location of the break the steam flow from 
one or both steam generators will increase. In the analysis it was conservatively 
assumed that the break is located upstream of the main steam isolation valve in the 
steam line 2 (loop without pressurizer). Further, it was assumed that the flow to the 
turbine remained constant and equal to the steady state value, Figure 8. The steam 
flow of both steam generators therefore increase and the extracted heat from the 
primary system increases thus resulting in a decrease of temperatures on the 
primary side. In the presence of the negative moderator reactivity feedback the 
nuclear power and the fuel temperature will increase. The combination of increased 
heat production on one side and the decreased margin to DNB due to lower primary 
pressure may lead to fuel damage if the heat production in the core is not stopped. 
For larger breaks, the low steam line pressure signal will actuate the safety 
injection signal that will actuate reactor trip. For smaller breaks the OPΔT 
protection may be required to trip the reactor. Similarly to the FM DFT, the OPΔT 
trip provides the protection for this transient due to increased compensated 
measured temperature increase in reactor vessel whereas the set point will not 
change. The same conservative assumptions as for the FM DFT accident were used 
in the analysis, i.e., the end of cycle when the moderator reactivity coefficient has 
the maximum negative value. The results for the secondary pressure and 
compensated steam line pressure for two break areas leading to OPΔT trip (0.0221 












OTDT setp.-loop 1                       
Meas. DT (OTDT)-loop1                   
OTDT setp.-loop 2                       
Meas. DT (OTDT)-loop 2                  
OPDT setp.-loop 1                       
Meas. DT (OPDT)-loop 1                  
OPDT setp.-loop 2                       
Meas. DT (OPDT)-loop 2                  
N EK R T D B E, EO C , FM D FT , C ase 1





m2) and to SI (0.0222 m2) are shown in Figure 9. For 0.0222 m2 break, the main 
steam line isolation is actuated together with the safety injection. From that point 
onward, the pressure of the two steam generators decouple after steam line 
isolation. For the 0.0221 m2 break, the two steam generators continue to discharge 
its inventory through the break after reactor and turbine trip as it is also illustrated 
in Figure 8. 
Table I. RELAP5 results for FM DFT accident 
Case Time of reactor trip (OPΔT) 
Max. nuclear 
power (%) 
Max. core heat 
power (%) 
1. Base case best-estimate, cold leg 
temp. compensation (OPΔT): lag (2 s) 





111.4% (44.3 s) 
 
109.5% (44.9 s) 
b) dft_be_00_manual (Manual rod 
control) 44.3 s 111.4% (44.3 s) 109.5% (44.9 s) 
2. Base case, cold leg temperature 
compensation (OPΔT): lag (7 s) 







113.49% (50.3 s) 
 
 
111.86% (50.8 s) 
b) dft_be_01_manual (Manual rod 
control) 50.34 s 113.49% (50.3 s) 111.86% (50.8 s) 
3. Base case, cold leg temperature 
compensation (OPΔT): lead-lag (30s, 
10 s) 







105.17% (31.4 s) 
 
 
103.4% (31.8 s) 
4. Conservative calculation, ref. [5], 
cold leg temp. compensation (OPΔT): 
lag (2 s) 
 





(43.8 s, ref. [5]) 
 
 
117.95% (48.3 s) 
 
 
117.04% (48.4 s); 
(118.1% (44.2 s), ref. 
[5]) 




 (33.1 s, ref. [5]) 
118.44% (45.2 s) 
 
117.8% (45.0 s); 
(118.6% (33.5 s), ref. 
[5]) 
5. Best-estimate calculation for 
configuration before RTDBE 







110.13% (40.2 s) 
 
 
107.69% (40.4 s) 
b) dft_rtd_manual (Manual rod 
control) 40.24 s 109.7% (40.2 s) 107.64% (40.9 s) 
 
Similarly to the previous analysis for FM DFT, a number of sensitivity study 
calculations were performed to assess the effectiveness of protective functions. 
Seven groups of HFP MSLB analyses have been performed: 
1. RTDBE base case best-estimate calculation, OPΔT cold leg temperature 
compensation: lag (time constant=2 s). Four cases have been analyzed: 
a) mslb_be_00_notrip (the largest break where no reactor trip signal is actuated) 
b) mslb_be_00_first_trip (the smallest break where reactor trip signal is actuated) 





c) mslb_be_00_opdt (the largest break where the safety injection signal is not 
actuated, the OPΔT signal trips the reactor) 
d) mslb_be_00_si (the smallest break where the safety injection signal actuates 
reactor trip) 
2. RTDBE base case best-estimate calculation, OPΔT cold leg temperature 
compensation: lag (time constant=2 s). Steam line pressure signal for steam line 
isolation and safety injection was compensated by lead-lag element as for the pre-
RTDBE with lead and lag time constant equal to 50 s and 5 seconds, respectively. 
The aim of the analysis is to evaluate the influence of the new RTDBE OPΔT 
protection as well as of steam line pressure compensation on transient results. Two 
cases have been analyzed: 
a) mslb_be_00_opdt_1 (the largest break where the safety injection signal is not 
actuated, the OPΔT signal trips the reactor). 
b) mslb_be_00_si_1 (the smallest break where the safety injection signal actuates 
reactor trip). 
3. RTDBE best-estimate calculation, OPΔT cold leg temperature compensation: 
lag (time constant=7 s). The aim of the sensitivity calculation is to estimate the 
influence of cold leg temperature lag time constant. Four cases have been analyzed: 
a) mslb_be_01_notrip (the largest break where no reactor trip signal is actuated) 
b) mslb_be_01_first_trip (the smallest break where reactor trip signal is actuated) 
c) mslb_be_01_opdt (the largest break where the safety injection signal is not 
actuated, the OPΔT signal trips the reactor) 
d) mslb_be_01_si (the smallest break where the safety injection signal actuates 
reactor trip) 
4. RTDBE best-estimate calculation, OPΔT cold leg temperature lead-lag 
compensation with lead and lag time constants equal to 30 s and 10 s, respectively. 
Three cases have been analyzed: 
a) mslb_be_02_notrip (the largest break where no reactor trip signal is actuated 
b) mslb_be_02_opdt (the largest break where the safety injection signal is not 
actuated, the OPΔT signal trips the reactor) 
c) mslb_be_02_si (the smallest break where the safety injection signal actuates 
reactor trip) 
5. RTDBE conservative calculation with the assumptions from the referent 
literature, e.g., ref. [6]: 1) The SAL limit for OPΔT set point calculation with 
K4=1.15 instead of 1.08, 2) OPΔT trip  actuation if the set point is reached in both 
loops, 3) Conservative moderator (maximum) and Doppler (minimum) reactivity 
feedback coefficients, 4) Feed water flow =steam flow until feed water isolation and 
5) The maximum initial RCS average temperature (580.55 K). OPΔT cold leg 
temperature compensation lag time constant=2 s. Three cases have been analyzed: 
a) mslb_sal_notrip (the largest break where no reactor trip signal is actuated) 
b) mslb_sal_opdt (the largest break where the safety injection signal is not 
actuated, the OPΔT signal trips the reactor) 
c) mslb_sal_si (the smallest break where the safety injection signal actuates 
reactor trip) 
6. RTD best-estimate calculation. The case represents the configuration before 
the RTDBE modification, i.e., with RTD bypass. Low steam line pressure signal for 
steam line isolation and safety injection was compensated by the pre-RTDBE lead-





lag element with lead and lag time constant equal to 50 s and 5 seconds, 
respectively. Four cases have been analyzed: 
a) mslb_rtd_notrip (the largest break where no reactor trip signal is actuated) 
b) mslb_rtd_first_trip (the smallest break where reactor trip signal is actuated) 
c) mslb_rtd_opdt (the largest break where the safety injection signal is not 
actuated, the OPΔT signal trips the reactor). 
d) mslb_rtd_si (the smallest break where the safety injection signal actuates 
reactor trip). 
7. RTD best-estimate calculation. The case represents the configuration before 
the RTDBE modification, i.e., with RTD bypass. Steam line pressure signal for 
steam line isolation and safety injection was compensated by the post-RTDBE lead-
lag element with lead and lag time constant equal to 48 s and 8 seconds, 
respectively. Two cases have been analyzed: 
a) mslb_rtd_opdt_1 (the largest break where the safety injection signal is not 
actuated, the OPΔT signal trips the reactor). 
b) mslb_rtd_si_1 (the smallest break where the safety injection signal actuates 
reactor trip). 
The results for the maximum nuclear and maximum core heat power are 
summarized in Table II. The comparison of the two base case calculations for the 
new and old configuration (Cases 1 and 2 and Cases 6 and 7) has shown the 
influence of both the change in OPΔT set point and the change of the low steam line 
pressure set point for safety injection actuation. In the pre-RTDBE original 
configuration the SI signal on low steam line pressure was more sensitive and it 
was actuated for smaller break size (0.0186 m2) than for the new RTDBE 
configuration (0.0222 m2). Among the base case best estimate cases (Case 1 and 
Case 6) the earliest reactor trip for the smallest break for SI actuation was actuated 
for the pre-RTDBE and consequently the maximum core heat power (102.14%) was 
the minimum for these two groups. For the largest break for the OPΔT calculation 
(base case) post-RTDBE (Case 1c-0.0221 m2) the larger maximum core heat power 
(109.02%) than for the corresponding  pre-RTDBE case (107.13% , Case 6c-0.0185 
m2) was obtained. On one side, for larger breaks more adverse conditions on the 
primary side result before reactor trip than for the smaller break areas. Secondly, 
the OPΔT response for the post-RTDBE is slower for the post than for the pre-
RTDBE configuration. The sensitivity analysis for the post-RTDBE and steam line 
compensation as for pre-RTDBE (Case 2a) and for the same break area as for the 
corresponding pre-RTDBE case (Case 6c) has shown that the post-RTDBE OPΔT 
function is slower than the pre-RTDBE OPΔT function (5.65 s later response). The 
resulting difference for the maximum heat flux between these two cases (108.63% 
and 107.13%) is slightly less than between the cases 1c and 6c due to smaller break 
size in the former case. However, the obtained differences for the maximum heat 
flux between these two base cases are small (less than 2%).  A smaller difference for 
the response time of the OPΔT function (4.77 s) between the post and pre-RTDBE 
was obtained for larger break area (0.0221 m2) when comparing the base post-
RTDBE case (1c) with the pre-RTDBE sensitivity case 7a. Again, the difference for 
the maximum heat power between these two cases is rather small (1.65%). The 
similar results were obtained for the FM-DFT analysis, e.g., by comparing the cases 





1a and 5a (Table I) the post-RTDBE has a slower response (4.1 s) than the pre-
RTDBE and correspondingly the higher maximum core heat power (1.8%). 
For the post-RTDBE with the pre-RTDBE steam line compensation (Case 2) 
the similar results as for the base case pre-RTDBE were obtained for the smallest 
break area for SI actuation (Case 2b; reactor trip at time=10.21 s due to SI signal 
resulting in a low maximum core heat power=101.87%). The calculated differences 
for the maximum core heat power between the base case post-RTDBE and the base 
case pre-RTDBE are small for both groups of break areas leading to either OPΔT 
trip or to the trip due to SI. The results for the core heat power are presented in 
Figure 10. For the RTDBE Case 3 (cold leg temperature lag compensation time 
constant=7 s) the maximum core heat power was larger (110.76%) than for the base 
case 1 (109.02%) since the OPΔT trip was actuated later. Similarly to the FM DFT 
analysis, for the Case 4 (lead-lag compensation) a fast response for the OPΔT trip 
has resulted in a considerably smaller maximum core heat power (103.5%) than for 
the base case. The largest break area for which no trip is actuated is almost 
identical for all the analyzed best-estimate cases (0.0085 m2 for the Case 4 and 
0.0088 m2 for the rest of the cases). The maximum core heat power for that break 
area has stabilized at approx. 107.63% that corresponds to the value at which the 
total removed power on the secondary side (turbine and break) are equal to the 
elevated core power. The smallest break area for which the OPΔT trip is actuated 
was equal to 0.0089 m2 for both the base pre and post-RTDBE calculations (cases 1b 
and 6b). As expected from the previous discussion, the OPΔT trip was actuated 
earlier for the pre-RTDBE than for the post-RTDBE case (172.15 s vs. 190.8 s). 
However, for this limiting small break, the maximum core heat power is close to the 
no-trip case and it was equal for both cases (107.7%). For conservative calculation, a 
good agreement between RELAP5 analysis and referent literature (ref. [6]) was 
obtained. The similar values for the maximum core heat power for RELAP5 
analysis and ref. [6] were obtained (123.21% and 122.1%) and for the slightly larger 
break area for RELAP5 calculation (0.03198 m2 vs. 0.0307 m2). For the maximum 
core heat power greater than 118% detailed nuclear analysis is performed (not 
presented here) in order to demonstrate that the limiting acceptance criteria are 
met. The nuclear analysis presented in ref. [6] has shown that the minimum margin 
to minimum DNBR is greater than 9%. 






Figure 8. HFP MSLB analysis, base case, Case 1c (0.0221m2 break), Steam flow, 
nuclear power, core heat power and power transferred in SGs 
 
Figure 9. HFP MSLB analysis, secondary pressure and compensated steam line 































































































SG 1 steam flow
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SG 1 press.-0.0221 m2                   
SG 2 press.-0.0221 m2                   
SG 1 press.-0.0222 m2                   
SG 2 press.-0.0222 m2                   
SL 1 comp. press.-0.0221 m2             
SL 2 comp. press.-0.0221 m2             
SL 1 comp. press.-0.0222 m2             
SL 2 comp. press.-0.0222 m2             
N EK R T D B E, EO C , HFP M SL B
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Table II. RELAP5 results for HFP MSLB accident
Case Break area (m2) 




Max. core heat 
power (%) 
1. Base case best-estimate 
(RTDBE), cold leg temp. 










107.63% (208 s) 
 
 
107.63% (216 s) 
b) mslb_be_00_first_trip 0.0089 190.8 s (OPΔT) 107.7% (190.8 s) 107.7% (190.8 s) 
c) mslb_be_00_opdt – last OPΔT 0.0221 24.86 s (OPΔT) 110.41% (24.8 s) 109.02% (25.5 s) 
d) mslb_be_00_si 0.0222 12.2 s (on SI) 105.76% (12.2 s) 103.41% (12.8 s) 
2. RTDBE, steam line pressure 
compensation as for before RTDBE 






28.78 s (OPΔT) 
 
 
109.66% (28.7 s) 
 
 
108.63% (29.0 s) 
b) mslb_be_00_si_1 0.0187 10.21 s (on SI) 103.81% (10.2 s) 101.87% (10.5 s) 
3. RTDBE, cold leg temp. 










107.63% (208 s) 
 
 
107.63% (216 s) 
b) mslb_be_01_first_trip 0.0089 194.9 s (OPΔT) 107.7% (194.9 s) 107.7% (195 s) 
c) mslb_be_01_opdt – last OPΔT 0.0221 31.59 s (OPΔT) 111.78% (31.5 s) 110.76% (31.8 s) 
d) mslb_be_01_si – identical to 
mslb_be_00_si 0.0222 12.2 s (on SI) 105.76% (12.2 s) 103.41% (12.8 s) 
4. RTDBE, cold leg temp. 
compensation (OPΔT): lead-lag (30 










107.38% (200 s) 
 
 
107.38% (216 s) 
b) mslb_be_02_opdt – last OPΔT 0.0221 12.27 s (OPΔT) 105.75% (12.2 s) 103.5% (12.8 s) 
c) mslb_be_02_si – identical to 
mslb_be_00_si 0.0222 12.2 s (on SI) 105.76% (1220 s) 103.41% (12.8 s) 
5. Conservative calculation, ref. [6], 
cold leg temp. compensation 





















115.78% (100 s) 
 
 
115.76% (100 s); 









28.48 s (OPΔT); 
(27.15 s, ref. [6]) 
 
 




123.21% (28.8 s); 





12.49 s (on SI) 
 
112.92% (12.4 s) 
 
107.68% (13.0 s) 
6. Best-estimate calculation for 

















172.15 s (OPΔT) 




107.64% (208 s) 
107.7% (172 s) 
108.5% (23.1 s) 




107.64% (216 s) 
107.7% (172 s) 
107.13% (23.4 s) 
102.14% (11.2 s) 10.72 s (on SI) 
7. Best-estimate calculation for 
configuration before RTDBE, steam 
line pressure compensation as for 
RTDBE 
















107.37% (20.5 s) 
b) mslb_rtd_si_1 0.0222 12.2 s (on SI) 105.76% (12.0 s) 103.41% (12.8 s) 
 




Figure 10. HFP MSLB analysis, core heat power, sensitivity calculations for 





NPP Krško has changed way of RCS coolant measurement from RTD bypass 
to thermowell mounted RTDs as part of RTDBE project aimed to improve operation 
and maintenance. The compensation of the signal representing the coolant 
temperature increase (ΔT) in reactor vessel for the OPΔT protection function has 
been modified as part of the RTDBE. In the paper, different concepts for coolant 
temperature compensation were studied for the decrease of feedwater temperature 
(FM DFT) and main steam line break at hot full power (HFP MSLB). Following 
conclusions can be drawn from the performed RELAP5 analyses: 
• The cold leg temperature compensation for the base case post-RTDBE 
configuration (lag compensation, time constant=2 s) results in a delayed response of 
the OPΔT trip when compared with the pre-RTDBE configuration. However, the 
obtained differences for the maximum heat power between the post and pre-RTDBE 
concepts are small (less than 2% for both accidents). 
• By increasing the lag compensation for the cold leg temperature from 2 s to 7 
s the maximum core heat power for the analyzed accidents would increase by less 
than (2-3)%. 



























• The sensitivity calculation with lead-lag compensation for the cold leg 
temperature with greater lead time constant (30 s vs. lag time constant=10 s) 
would result in fast response of the OPΔT trip for both accidents and in the 
considerably lower maximum core heat power than for the pre-RTDBE 
configuration. That concept has shown to be sensitive to electromagnetic 
disturbances and it would cause unnecessary reactor trips. 
• The analysis for the main steam line break has shown that the change of the 
steam line pressure compensation has a significant influence on the minimum 
break size for safety injection actuation. The change of the lead-lag 
compensation (48 s and 8 s vs. 50 s and 5 s) introduced along with the RTDBE 
leads to an increase of the minimum break size (0.0222 m2 vs. 0.0186 m2 for 
the pre-RTDBE). 
• For both the FM DFT and the HFP MSLB accident similar values for the 
maximum  nuclear power and the maximum core heat power values for the 
cases where OPΔT signal is actuated were obtained (e.g., the maximum core 
heat power for the base case post-RTDBE configuration: 109.5% for the FM 
DFT and 109.02% for the HFP MSLB). The obtained maximum values are 
acceptable and demonstrate the adequacy of the selected post-RTDBE OPΔT 
protection concept (cold leg temperature lag compensation, time constant= 2s) 
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